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Abstract — It is well known that ZFC, despite its usefulness as a foundational theory
for mathematics, has two unwanted features: it cannot be written down explicitly due to
its infinitely many axioms, and it has a countable model due to the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem
theorem. This paper presents the axioms one has to accept to get rid of these two
features. For that matter, some twenty axioms are formulated in a nonstandard first-
order language with countably many constants: to this collection of axioms is associated
a universe of discourse consisting of a class of objects, each of which is a set, and a class of
arrows, each of which is a function. The axioms of ZF are derived from this finite axiom
scheme, and it is shown that it does not have a countable model—if it has a model at
all, that is. Furthermore, the axioms of category theory are proven to hold: the present
universe may therefore serve as an ontological basis for category theory. However, it has
not been investigated whether any of the soundness and completeness properties hold for
the present theory: the inevitable conclusion is therefore that only further research can
establish whether the present results indeed constitute an advancement in the foundations
of mathematics.
1 Introduction
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, which emerged from the axiomatic set theory proposed by Zermelo
in [1] by implementing improvements suggested independently by Skolem and Fraenkel, is
without a doubt the most widely accepted foundational theory for mathematics. However,
it has two features that we may call ‘unwanted’ or ‘pathological’. Let us, in accordance with
common convention, use ZFC to denote the full theory, ZF for the full theory minus the axiom of
choice (AC), and let us use ZF(C) in statements that are to hold for both ZF and ZFC; the first
pathological feature is then that the number of axioms of ZF(C) is infinite, as a result of which
ZF(C) cannot be written down explicitly. The second is that ZF(C) has a countable model (if
it has a model at all), which is a corollary of the downward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem [2, 3]:
as a result, we have to swallow that there is a model of ZF(C) in which the powerset of the
natural numbers is countable. The purpose of this paper is to present the axioms one has to
accept such that the axioms of ZF can be derived from the new axioms—we omit a discussion
of AC—but such that these two pathological features are both removed. The collection of these
new axioms will henceforth be referred to with the symbol T (a Gothic ‘T’): it is thus the case
that T has a finite number of non-logical axioms of finite length. The remainder of this section
is intended as a global introduction to T—the purpose is not, however, to review every idea
ever published on this topic.
First of all, at least one set theory that can be finitely axiomatized has already been sug-
gested, namely Von Neumann-Go¨del-Bernays set theory (NGB)—NGB is provably a mere con-
servative extension of ZF, and as such “it seems to be no stronger than ZF” [4]. However, NGB
∗e-mail: Marcoen.Cabbolet@vub.ac.be
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shares the second of the two aforementioned unwanted features with ZF. In that regard, Von
Neumann has been quoted stating
“At present we can do no more than note that we have one more reason here
to entertain reservations about set theory and that for the time being no way of
rehabilitating this theory is known.” [5]
That said, a finite theory in the same language as ZF (without extra objects) and as strong
as ZF has already been proved impossible by Montague [6]: the present finitely axiomatized
theory T therefore entails a rather drastic departure from the language and ontology of ZF.
Earlier a radical departure has already been suggested by Lawvere, who formulated a theory
of the category of sets: here the ∈-relation has been defined in terms of the primitive notions
of category theory, that is, in terms of mappings, domains and codomains [7]. The present
theory T, however, is more of a “marriage”–by lack of a better term—between set theory and
category theory: the ∈-relation is maintained as an atomic expression, while the notion of a
category is built in as the main structural element. So regarding the philosophical position on
the status of category theory, here neither Lawvere’s position is taken, that category theory
provides the foundation for mathematics [8], nor Mayberry’s position that category theory
requires set theory as a foundation [9], nor Landry’s position that category theory provides (all
of) the language for mathematics [10]: instead, the present position is that category theory is
incorporated in the foundations.
Category theory being incorporated means that the universe of (mathematical) discourse is
not Cantor’s paradise of sets, but a category:
Definition 1.1. The universe of discourse is a category C consisting of
(i) a proper class of objects, each of which is a set;
(ii) a proper class of arrows, each of which is a function.

As to the meaning of the term universe of discourse in Def. 1.1, the following quote from a
standard textbook is interesting:
“Instead of having to say the entities to which the predicates might in principle
apply, we can make things easier for ourselves by collectively calling these entities
the universe of discourse.” [11]
So, a theory without a universe of discourse is nothing but a scheme of meaningless strings of
symbols, which are its axioms; an inference rule is then nothing but a rule by which (other)
meaningless strings of symbols can be “deduced” from those axioms. Such a notion of ‘theory’
might be acceptable from the perspective of a formalist, but here the position is taken that
theories c.q. strings of symbols without meaning are not interesting. So, to the present theory
T is associated a Platonic universe of discourse—in casu the category C of Def. 1.1—which
we can think of as being made up of the things that satisfy the axioms of T. But that does
not mean that for every thing in the universe of discourse a constant needs to be included in
the formal language: the vocabulary contains only countably many constants. But T has been
formulated with an intended model in mind: its universe is then a “Platonic imitation” of the
universe of discourse. Below we briefly elaborate on the universe of discourse using set-builder
notation: strictly speaking this is not a part of the formal language, but given its status as a
widely used tool for the description of sets it is suitable for an informal introductory exposition
that one can hold in the back of one’s mind.
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For starters, the primitive notion of a set is, of course, that it is an object made up of
elements: a thing α being an element of a set S is formalized by an irreducible ∈-relation, that
is, by an atomic expression of the form α ∈ S. The binary predicate ‘∈’ is part of the language
for T: there is no need to express it in the language of category theory, since that does not
yield a simplification. (Hence the language of the present theory is not reduced to the language
of category theory.) In ZF we then have the adage ‘everything is a set’, meaning that if we
have x ∈ y, then x is a set too. Here, however, that adage remains valid in this proper class of
objects only to the extent that all the objects are sets—the adage does not hold for all elements
of all sets. That is, we will assume that every object of the category is either the empty set
or an object that contains elements, but an element of an object—if any—can either be the
empty set, or again an object made up of elements, or a function: a function is then not a set.
A number of constructive set-theoretical axioms then describe in terms of the ∈-relation which
sets there are at least in this proper class of sets; these axioms are very simple theorems of ZF
that hardly need any elaboration.
As to the notion of a function, in the framework of ZF a function is identified with its graph.
However, as hinted at above, here we reject that set-theoretical reduction. First of all, functions
are objects sui generis. If we use simple symbols like X and Y for sets, then a composite symbol
fX—to be pronounced “f-on-X”—can be used for a function on X: in the intended model, a
function is a thing fX where f stands for the graph of the function and X for its domain. To
give an example, let the numbers 0 and 1 be defined as sets, e.g. by 0 := ∅ and 1 := {∅}, and
let, for sets x and y, a two-tuple 〈x, y〉 be defined as a set, e.g. by 〈x, y〉 := {x, {x, y}}; then
the composite symbol {〈0, 1〉, 〈1, 0〉}{0,1} refers to the function on the set {0, 1} whose graph is
the set {〈0, 1〉, 〈1, 0〉}. However, we have fX 6= Y for any function on any domain X and for
any set Y , so
{〈0, 1〉, 〈1, 0〉}{0,1} 6= {〈0, 1〉, 〈1, 0〉} (1)
That is, the function {〈0, 1〉, 〈1, 0〉}{0,1} is not identical to its graph {〈0, 1〉, 〈1, 0〉}—nor, in fact,
to any other set Y . At this point one might be inclined to think that the whole idea of functions
on a set as objects sui generis is superfluous, and should be eliminated in favor of the idea that
functions are identified with their graphs (which are sets). That, however, has already been
tried in an earlier stage of this investigation: it turned out to lead to unsolvable difficulties
with the interpretation of the formalism, cf. [12]. The crux is that the main constructive axiom
of the theory—here a constructive axiom is an axiom that, when certain things are given (e.g.
one or two sets or a set and a predicate), states the existence of a uniquely determined other
thing [13]—‘produces’ things referred to by a symbol FX : one gets into unsolvable difficulties
if one tries to interpret these things as sets.
But functions are not only different things than sets. Contrary to a set, a function in
addition has a domain and a codomain—both are sets—and it also does something : namely,
it maps every element in its domain to an element in its codomain. This first aspect, that a
function ‘has’ a domain and a codomain, can be expressed in the language of category theory:
an atomic formula fX : Y  Z expresses that the function fX has domain Y and codomain
Z. In accordance with existing convention, the two-headed arrow ‘’ expresses that fX is a
surjection: the codomain is always the set of the images of the elements of the domain under
fX . Since such an expression fX : Y  Z is irreducible in the present framework, it requires
some function-theoretical axioms to specify when such an atomic formula is true and when not.
For example, for the function {〈0, 1〉, 〈1, 0〉}{0,1} discussed above we have
{〈0, 1〉, 〈1, 0〉}{0,1} : {0, 1} {0, 1} (2)
while other expressions {〈0, 1〉, 〈1, 0〉}{0,1} : Y  Z are false. Again, at this point one might be
inclined to think that these expression fX : Y  Z are superfluous, because the notation fX
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already indicates that X is the domain of fX . The crux, however, is that these expressions are
essential to get to a finite axiomatization: we may, then, have the opinion that it is obvious from
the notation fX that X is the domain of fX , but only an expression fX : X  Z expresses this
fact—it is, thus, an axiom of the theory that fX : Y  Z is only true if Y = X. In particular,
this expression is not true if Y  X.
The second aspect, that for any set X any function fX ‘maps’ an element y of its domain
to an element z of its codomain is expressed by another atomic formula fX : y 7→ z. In the
framework of ZF this is just a notation for 〈y, z〉 ∈ fX , but in the present framework this is
also an irreducible expression: therefore, it requires some more function-theoretical axioms to
specify when such an atomic formula is true and when not. The idea, however, is this: given
a set X and a function fX , precisely one expression fX : y 7→ z is true for each element y in
the domain of fX . E.g. we have
{〈0, 1〉, 〈1, 0〉}{0,1} : 0 7→ 1 (3)
{〈0, 1〉, 〈1, 0〉}{0,1} : 1 7→ 0 (4)
for the above function {〈0, 1〉, 〈1, 0〉}{0,1}.
All the above can be expressed with a dozen and a half very simple axioms—these can, in
fact, all be reformulated in the framework of ZF. The present axiomatic scheme does, however,
contain ‘new mathematics’ in the form of the second axiom of a pair of constructive, function-
theoretical axioms. The first one is again very simple, and merely states that given any two
singletons X = {x} and Y = {y}, there exists an ‘ur-function’ that maps the one element x of
X to the one element y of Y . An ur-function is thus a function with a singleton domain and a
singleton codomain. The above function {〈0, 1〉, 〈1, 0〉}{0,1} is thus not an ur-function, but the
function referred to by the symbol {〈0, 1〉}{0} is: we have
{〈0, 1〉}{0} : {0} {1} (5)
{〈0, 1〉}{0} : 0 7→ 1 (6)
That said, the second of the pair of constructive, function-theoretical axioms is a new mathe-
matical principle: it states that given any family of ur-functions f{j} indexed in a set Z, there
exists a sum function FZ such that the sum function maps an element j of Z to the same
image as the corresponding ur-function f{j}. The formulation of this principle requires, how-
ever, a new nonstandard concept that can be called a ‘multiple quantifier’. This new concept
can be explained as follows. Suppose we have defined the natural numbers 0, 1, 2, . . . as sets,
suppose the singletons {0}, {1}, {2}, . . . exist as well, and suppose we also have the set of nat-
ural numbers ω = {0, 1, 2, . . .}. We can, then, consider variables f{0}, f{1}, f{2}, . . . ranging over
all ur-functions on a singleton of a natural number as indicated by the subscript—so, f{0} is
a variable that ranges over all ur-functions on the singleton of 0. In the standard first-order
language of ZF we have the possibility to quantify over all ur-functions on a singleton {a} by
using a quantifier ∀f{a}, and we have the possibility to use any finite number of such quantifiers
in a sentence. E.g. we can have a formula
∀f{0}∀f{1}∀f{2}Ψ (7)
meaning: for all ur-functions on {0} and for all ur-functions on {1} and for all ur-functions on
{2}, Ψ. We can then introduce a new notation by the following postulate of meaning:
(∀f{j})j∈{0,1,2}Ψ⇔ ∀f{0}∀f{1}∀f{2}Ψ (8)
This new formula can be read as: for any family of ur-functions indexed in {0, 1, 2}, Ψ. So
(∀f{i})i∈{0,1,2} is then a multiple quantifier that, in this case, is equivalent to three quantifiers in
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standard first-order language. The next step is now that we lift the restriction that a multiple
quantifier has to be equivalent to a finite number of standard quantifiers: with that step we
enter into nonstandard territory. In the nonstandard language of T we can consider a formula
like
(∀f{i})i∈ωΨ (9)
The multiple quantifier is equivalent to a sequence ∀f{0}∀f{1}∀f{2} · · · of infinitely many stan-
dard quantifiers in this case. But in the present framework the constant ω in formula (9)
can be replaced by any constant, yielding nonstandard multiple quantifiers equivalent to an
uncountably infinite number of standard quantifiers.
To yield meaningful theorems, the subformula Ψ of formula (9) has to be open in infinitely
many variables f{0}, f{1}, f{2}, . . ., each of which ranges over all ur-functions on a singleton of a
natural number. This is achieved by placing a conjunctive operator
∧
i∈ω in front of a standard
first-order formula Ψ(f{i}) that is open in a composite variable f{i}, yielding an expression∧
i∈ω
Ψ(f{i}) (10)
Syntactically this is a formula of finite length, but semantically it is the conjunction of a
countably infinite family of formulas Ψ(f{0}),Ψ(f{1}),Ψ(f{2}), . . .. Together with the multiple
quantifier from formula (9) it yields a sentence (∀f{i})i∈ω
∧
i∈ωΨ(f{i}): semantically it contains
a bound occurrence of the variables f{0}, f{1}, f{2}, . . .. The nonstandard ‘sum function axiom’
constructed with these formal language elements is so powerful that it allows to derive the
infinite schemes SEP and SUB of ZF from just a finite number of axioms.
That said, the literature already contains a plethora of so-called infinitary logics ; see [14]
for a short, general overview. In the framework of such an infinitary logic, one typically can
form infinitary conjunctions of a collection Σ of standard first-order formulas indexed by some
set S. So, if Σ = {φj | j ∈ S} is such a collection of formulas, then a formula
∧
Σ stands for
∧j∈Sφj, which resembles formula (10). That way, one can, for example, form the conjunction
of all the formulas of the SEP scheme of ZF: that yields a finite axiomatization of set theory.
However, such an infinitary conjunction cannot be written down explicitly: the string of symbols
‘∧j∈Sφj’ is an informal abbreviation that is not part of the formal language—that is, it is not
a well-formed formula. In the present case, however, we are only interested in well-formed
formulas of finite length, which can be written down explicitly. This is achieved by building
restrictions in the definition of the syntax, so that a conjunctive operator like
∧
x∈ω only forms
a well-formed formula if it is put in front of an atomic expression of the type f{x} : x 7→ t(x)
where both f{x} and t(x) are terms with an occurrence of the same variable x that occurs in
the conjunctive operator: that way typographically finite expressions obtain that semantically
are infinitary conjunctions. So, the language for our theory T is much more narrowly defined
than the language of (overly?) general infinitary logics: as it turns out, that suffices for our
present aims.
That brings us to the next point, which is to discuss the (possible) practical use of the
new finite theory T as a foundational theory for mathematics. The practical usefulness of the
scheme lies therein that it (i) provides an easy way to construct sets, and (ii) that categories
like Top, Mon, Grp, etc, which are subjects of study in category theory, can be viewed as
subcategories of the category of sets and functions of Def. 1.1, thus providing a new approach to
the foundational problem identified in [15]. While that latter point (ii) hardly needs elaboration,
the former (i) does. The crux is that one doesn’t need to apply the nonstandard sum function
axiom directly: what one uses is the theorem—or rather: the theorem scheme—that given any
set X, we can construct a new function on X by giving a function prescription. So, this is a
philosophical nuance: in ZF one constructs a new object with the ∈-relation, but in the present
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framework one can construct a new function fX not with the ∈-relation, but by simply defining
which expressions fX : y 7→ z are true for the elements y in the domain. On account of the
sum function axiom, it is then a guarantee that the function fX exists. So, given any set X
one can simply give a defining function prescription
fX : y
def7−→ ızΦ(y, z) (11)
(where the iota-term ızΦ(y, z) denotes the unique thing z for which the functional relation
Φ(y, z) holds) and it is then a guarantee that fX exists. And having constructed the function,
we have implicitly constructed its graph and its image set. Ergo, giving a function prescription
is constructing a set. The nonstandard axiom, which may be cumbersome to use directly, stays
thus in the background: one uses the main theorem of T.
What remains to be discussed is that T, as mentioned in the first paragraph, entails the
axioms of ZF and does not have a countable model. As to the first-mentioned property, it will
be proven that the infinite axiom schemes SEP and SUP of ZF, translated in the formal lan-
guage of T, can be derived from the finitely axiomatized theory T: that provides an argument
for considering T to be not weaker than ZF. Secondly, even though the language of T has only
countably many constants, it will be shown that the validity of the nonstandard sum function
axiom in a modelM of T has the consequence that the downward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem
does not hold: if T has a model M, then M is uncountable. This is a significant result that
does not hold in the framework of ZF: it provides, therefore, an argument for considering T to
be stronger than ZF.
That concludes the introductory discussion. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
The next section axiomatically introduces this finitely axiomatized nonstandard theory T. The
section thereafter discusses the theory T (i) by deriving its main theorem, (ii) by deriving the
axiom schemes SEP and SUB of ZF, (iii) by showing that the downward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem
theorem does not hold for the nonstandard theory T, (iv) by showing the axioms of category
theory hold for the class of arrows of the universe of discourse meant in Def. 1.1, and (v) by
addressing the main concerns for inconsistency. The final section states the conclusions.
2 Axiomatic introduction
2.1 Formal language
First of all a remark. In standard first-order logic, the term ‘quantifier’ refers both to the
logical symbols ‘∀’ and ‘∃’ and to combinations like ∀x, ∃y consisting of such a symbol and a
variable. While that may be unproblematic in standard logic, here the logical symbols ‘∀’ and
‘∃’ are applied in different kinds of quantifiers. Therefore, to avoid confusion we will refer to
the symbol ‘∀’ with the term ‘universal quantification symbol’, and to the symbol ‘∃’ with the
term ‘existential quantification symbol’.
Definition 2.1. The vocabulary of the language LT of T consists of the following:
(i) the constants ∅ and ω, to be interpreted as the empty set and the first infinite ordinal;
(ii) the constants 1∅, to be interpreted as the inactive function;
(iii) simple variables x,X, y, Y, . . . ranging over sets;
(iv) for any constant Xˆ referring to an individual set, composite symbols fXˆ, gXˆ, . . . with an
occurrence of the constant Xˆ as the subscript are simple variables ranging over functions
on that set Xˆ;
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(v) for any simple variable X ranging over sets, composite symbols fX , gX , . . . with an occur-
rence of the variable X as the subscript are composite variables ranging over functions
on a set X;
(vi) simple variables α, β, . . . ranging over all things (sets and functions);
(vii) the binary predicates ‘∈’ and ‘=’, and the ternary predicates ‘(.) : (.)  (.)’ and ‘(.) :
(.) 7→ (.)’;
(viii) the logical connectives of first-order logic ¬,∧,∨,⇒,⇔;
(ix) the universal and existential quantification symbols ∀,∃;
(x) the brackets ‘(’ and ‘)’.

Remark 2.2. To distinguish between the theory T and its intended model, boldface symbols
with a hat like Xˆ, αˆ, etc. will be used to denote constants in the vocabulary of the theory
T, while underlined boldface symbols like X, α, etc., will be used to denote individuals in the
intended model of T. 
Definition 2.3. The syntax of the language LT is defined by the following clauses:
(i) if t is a constant, or a simple or a composite variable, then t is a term;
(ii) if t1 and t2 are terms, then t1 = t2 and t1 ∈ t2 are atomic formulas;
(iii) if t1, t2, and t3 are terms, then t1 : t2  t3 and t1 : t2 7→ t3 are atomic formulas;
(iv) if Φ and Ψ are formulas, then ¬Φ, (Φ ∧Ψ), (Φ ∨Ψ), (Φ⇒ Ψ), (Φ⇔ Ψ) are formulas;
(v) if Ψ is a formula and t a simple variable ranging over sets, over all things, or over functions
on a constant set, then ∀tΨ and ∃tΨ are formulas;
(vi) if X and fXˆ are simple variables ranging respectively over sets and over functions on
the set Xˆ, fX a composite variable with an occurrence of X as the subscript, and Ψ a
formula with an occurrence of a quantifier ∀fXˆ or ∃fXˆ but with no occurrence of X, then
∀X[X\Xˆ]Ψ and ∃X[X\Xˆ]Ψ are formulas.

Remark 2.4. Regarding clause (vi) of Def. 2.3, [u\t]Ψ is the formula obtained from Ψ by
replacing t everywhere by u. This definition will be used throughout this paper. Note that if
Ψ is a formula with an occurrence of the simple variable fXˆ, then [X\Xˆ]Ψ is a formula with
an occurrence of the composite variable fX . 
Definition 2.5. The language LT contains the following special language elements:
(i) if t is a simple variable ranging over sets, over all things, or over functions on a constant
set, then ∀t and ∃t are quantifiers with a simple variable;
(ii) if fX is a composite variable, then ∀fX and ∃fX are a quantifiers with a composite
variable.
A sequence like ∀X∀fX can be called a double quantifier. 
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The scope of a quantifier is defined as usual: note that a quantifier with a composite variable
can only occur in the scope of a quantifier with a simple variable. A free occurrence and a
bounded occurrence of a simple variable is also defined as usual; these notions can be simply
defined for formulas with a composite variable.
Definition 2.6. Let fX be a composite variable with an occurrence of the simple variable X;
then
(i) an occurrence of fX in a formula Ψ is free if that occurrence is neither in the scope of a
quantifier with the composite variable fX nor in the scope of a quantifier with the simple
variable X;
(ii) an occurrence of fX in a formula Ψ is bounded if that occurrence is in the scope of a
quantifier with the composite variable fX .
A sentence is a formula with no free variables—simple or composite. A formula is open in
a variable if there is a free occurrence of that variable. A formula that is open in a composite
variable fX is also open in the simple variable X. 
Definition 2.7. The semantics of any sentence without a quantifier with a composite variable
is as usual. Furthermore,
(i) a sentence ∀XΨ with an occurrence of a quantifier ∀fX or ∃fX with the composite variable
fX is valid in a modelM if and only if for every assignment g that assigns an individual
set g(X) = X in M as a value to the variable X, the sentence [X\X]Ψ is valid in M;
(ii) the sentence [X\X]Ψ obtained in clause (i) is a sentence without a quantifier with a
composite variable, hence with usual semantics.
The semantics of a sentence ∃XΨ with an occurrence of a quantifier ∀fX or ∃fX is left as an
exercise. 
After the introduction of the ‘standard’ first-order axioms of T, the language LT will be extended
to enable the formulation of the desired nonstandard formulas.
2.2 Set-theoretical axioms
Below the set-theoretical axioms are listed; these are all standard first-order formulas. Due to
the simplicity of the axioms, comments are kept to a bare minimum.
Axiom 2.8. Extensionality Axiom for Sets (EXT): two sets X and Y are identical if they have
the same things (sets and functions) as elements.
∀X∀Y (X = Y ⇔ ∀α(α ∈ X ⇔ α ∈ Y )) (12)

Axiom 2.9. For any set X, any function fX is not identical to any set Y :
∀X∀fX∀Y (fX 6= Y ) (13)

Axiom 2.10. A set X has no domain or codomain, nor does it map any thing to an image:
∀X∀α∀β(X : α 6 β ∧X : α 67→ β) (14)

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These latter two axioms establish that sets are different from functions on a set, and do not
have the properties of functions on a set.
Axiom 2.11. Empty Set Axiom (EMPTY): there exists a set X, designated by the constant
∅, that has no elements.
∃X(X = ∅ ∧ ∀α(α 6∈ X)) (15)

Axiom 2.12. Axiom of Pairing (PAIR): for every thing α and every thing β there exists a set
X that has precisely the things α and β as its elements.
∀α∀β∃X∀γ(γ ∈ X ⇔ γ = α ∨ γ = β) (16)

Remark 2.13. Using set-builder notation, the empty set can be interpreted as the individual
{} in the intended model. Furthermore, given individual things α and β in the universe of
the intended model, the pair set of α and β can then be identified with the individual {α,β}.
Note that this is a singleton if α = β. 
Definition 2.14. (Extension of vocabulary of LT.)
If t is a term, then (t)+ is a term, to be called “the singleton of t”—which may be written as t+
if no confusion arises. In particular, if α is a variable ranging over all things and x a variable
ranging over all sets, then α+ is a variable ranging over all singletons and x+ a variable ranging
over all singletons of sets. We thus have
∀α∀β(β = α+ ⇔ ∃X(β = X ∧ ∀γ(γ ∈ X ⇔ γ = α))) (17)
Likewise for x+. 
Notation 2.15. On account of Def. 2.14, the constants ∅+, ∅++, ∅+++, . . . are contained in the
language LT . Therefore, we can introduce the (finite) Zermelo ordinals at this point as a
notation for these singletons:
0 := ∅
1 := ∅+
2 := ∅++
...
(18)
According to the literature, the idea stems from unpublished work by Zermelo in 1916 [16]. 
Axiom 2.16. Sum Set Axiom (SUM): for every set X there exists a set Y made up of the
elements of the elements of X.
∀X∃Y ∀α(α ∈ Y ⇔ ∃Z(Z ∈ X ∧ α ∈ Z)) (19)

Remark 2.17. Given an individual set X in the universe of the intended model, the sum set
of X can be denoted by the symbol
⋃
X and, using set-builder notation, be identified with the
individual {α | ∃Z ∈ X(α ∈ Z)}. 
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Axiom 2.18. Powerset Axiom (POW): for every set X there is a set Y made up of the subsets
of X.
∀X∃Y ∀α(α ∈ Y ⇔ ∃Z(Z ⊂ X ∧ α = Z)) (20)

Remark 2.19. Given an individual set X in the universe of the intended model, the powerset
of X can be denoted by the symbol P(X) and, using set-builder notation, be identified with
the individual {x | x ⊂ X}. 
Axiom 2.20. Infinite Ordinal Axiom (INF): the infinite ordinal ω is the set of all finite Zermelo
ordinals.
0 ∈ ω ∧ ∀α(α ∈ ω ⇒ α+ ∈ ω) ∧ ∀β ∈ ω(6 ∃γ ∈ ω(β = γ+)⇔ β = ∅)) (21)

Remark 2.21. The set ω in INF is uniquely determined. In the intended model, the set ω can
be denoted by the symbol N and, using set-builder notation, be identified with the individual
N := { {}, {{}}, {{{}}}, . . .}. 
Axiom 2.22. Axiom of Regularity (REG): every nonempty set X contains an element α that
has no elements in common with X.
∀X 6= ∅∃α(α ∈ X ∧ ∀β(β ∈ α⇒ β 6∈ X)) (22)

Definition 2.23. For any things α and β, the two-tuple 〈α, β〉 is the pair set of α and the
pair set of α and β; using the iota-operator we get
〈α, β〉 := ıx(∀γ(γ ∈ x⇔ γ = α ∨ ∃Z(γ = Z ∧ ∀η(η ∈ Z ⇔ η = α ∨ η = β))) (23)

A simple corollary of Def. 2.23 is that for any things α and β, the two-tuple 〈α, β〉 always
exists. There is, thus, no danger of nonsensical terms involved in the use of the iota-operator
in Def. 2.23.
Remark 2.24. Given individual things α and β in the universe of the intended model, the
two-tuple 〈α,β〉 can, using set-builder notation, be identified with the individual {α, {α,β}}.

In principle, these set-theoretical axioms suffice: the function-theoretical axioms in the next
section provide other means for the construction of sets.
2.3 Standard function-theoretical axioms
Axiom 2.25. A function fX on a set X has no elements:
∀X∀fX∀α(α 6∈ fX) (24)

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Remark 2.26. One might think that Ax. 2.25 destroys the uniqueness of the empty set. But
that is not true. It is true that a function on a set X and the empty set share the property
that they have no elements, but the empty set is the only set that has this property: Ax. 2.9
guarantees, namely, that a function on a set X is not a set! 
Axiom 2.27. General Function-Theoretical Axiom (GEN-F): for any nonempty set X, any
function fX has a set Y as domain and a set Z as codomain, and maps every element α in Y
to a unique image β:
∀X∀fX(X 6= ∅ ⇒ ∃Y ∃Z(fX : Y  Z ∧ ∀α ∈ Y ∃!β(fX : α 7→ β))) (25)

Axiom 2.28. For any set X, any function fX has no other domain than X:
∀X∀fX∀α(α 6= X ⇒ ∀ξ(fX : α 6 ξ)) (26)

Axiom 2.29. For any set X, any function fX does not take a thing outside X as argument:
∀X∀fX∀α 6∈ X∀β(fX : α 67→ β) (27)

Remark 2.30. Ax. 2.27 dictates that precisely one expression fX : α 7→ β is true for each
α ∈ X. This doesn’t a priori exclude that such an expression can also be true for another thing
α not in X. But by Ax. 2.29 this is excluded. 
Axiom 2.31. For any nonempty set X and any function fX , the image set is the only codomain:
∀X∀fX(X 6= ∅ ⇒ ∀β(fX : X  β ⇒ ∃Z(β = Z∧∀γ(γ ∈ Z ⇔ ∃η ∈ X(fX : η 7→ γ))))) (28)
(This is the justification for the use of the two-headed arrow ‘’, commonly used for surjec-
tions.) 
Remark 2.32. Note that these first function-theoretical axioms already provide a tool to
construct a set: if we can construct a new function fX on a set X from existing functions
(an axiom will be given further below), then these axioms guarantee the existence of a unique
codomain made up of all the images of the elements of X under fX . 
Remark 2.33. Given an individual set X and an individual function fX in the universe of
the intended model, this unique codomain can be denoted by a symbol fX[X] or cod(fX), and,
using set-builder notation, be identified with the individual {β | ∃α ∈ X(fX : α 7→ β)} in the
universe of the intended model. Furthermore, given a thing α in X, its unique image under fX
can be denoted by the symbol fX(α). 
Notation 2.34. At this point we can introduce expressions fX : X → Y , to be read as “the
function f-on-X is a function from the set X to the set Y ”, by the postulate of meaning
fX : X → Y ⇔ ∃Z(fX : X  Z ∧ Z ⊂ Y ) (29)
This provides a connection to existing mathematical practices. 
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Axiom 2.35. Inverse Image Set Axiom (INV): for any nonempty set X and any function fX
with domain X and any co-domain Y , there is for any thing α a set Z ⊂ X that contains
precisely the elements of X that are mapped to α by fX :
∀X 6= ∅∀fX∀Y (fX : X  Y ⇒ ∀β∃Z∀α(α ∈ Z ⇔ α ∈ X ∧ fX : α 7→ β)) (30)

Remark 2.36. Note that INV, in addition to GEN-F, also provides a tool to construct a set:
if we have constructed a new function fX with domain X from existing functions, then with
this axiom guarantees that the inverse image set exists of any thing β in the codomain of fX .

Remark 2.37. Given an individual set X, an individual function fX, and an individual thing
β in the universe of the intended model, the unique inverse image set can be denoted by the
symbol f−1X (β) and can, using set-builder notation, be identified with the individual {α | α ∈
X ∧ fX : α 7→ β} in the universe of the intended model. 
Axiom 2.38. Extensionality Axiom for Functions (EXT-F): for any set X and any function
fX , and for any set Y and any function gY , the function fX and the function gY are identical
if and only if their domains are identical and their images are identical for every argument:
∀X∀fX∀Y ∀gY (fX = gY ⇔ X = Y ∧ ∀α∀β(fX : α 7→ β ⇔ gY : α 7→ β)) (31)

Axiom 2.39. Inactive Function Axiom (IN-F): there exists a function f∅, denoted by the
constant 1∅, which has the empty set as domain and codomain, and which doesn’t map any
argument to any image:
∃f∅(f∅ = 1∅ ∧ f∅ : ∅ ∅ ∧ ∀α∀β(f∅ : α 67→ β)) (32)

Note that there can be no other functions on the empty set than the inactive function 1∅,
since the image set is always empty: the atomic expression f∅ : ∅  A cannot be true for any
nonempty set A.
Axiom 2.40. Ur-Function Axiom (UFA): for any things α and β there exists an ur-function
fα+ with domain α
+ and codomain β+ that maps α to β:
∀α∀β∃fα+(fα+ : α+  β+ ∧ fα+ : α 7→ β) (33)

Remark 2.41. Given individual things α and β in the universe of the intended model, the
ur-function on {α} that maps α to β can, using set-builder notation, be identified with the
individual {〈α,β〉}{α} in the universe of the intended model. Note that the graph of the
ur-function is guaranteed to exist. 
Axiom 2.42. Axiom of Regularity for Functions (REG-F): for any set X and any function fX
with any codomain Y , fX does not take itself as argument or has itself as image:
∀X∀fX∀Y (fX : X  Y ⇒ ∀α(fX : fX 67→ α ∧ fX : α 67→ fX)) (34)

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Remark 2.43. As to the first part, Wittgenstein already mentioned that a function cannot
have itself as argument [17]. The second part is to exclude the existence of pathological ‘Siamese
twin functions’, e.g. the ur-function fX and gY given, using set-builder notation, by
fX : {hY } {fX} , fX : hY 7→ fX (35)
hY : {fX} {hY } , gY : fX 7→ gY (36)
We thus have dom(fX) = X = {hY } and dom(hY ) = Y = {fX}; if one tries to substitute
that in the above Eqs., then one gets ‘infinite towers’. These may not be constructible from
the axioms, but they could exist a priori in the category of sets and functions: to avoid that
we practice mathematical eugenics and prevent them from occurring with REG-F. See Fig. 1
for an illustration. The name ‘Siamese twin functions’ is derived from the name ‘Siamese twin
sets’ for sets A and B satisfying A ∈ B ∧B ∈ A, as published in [18]. 
Figure 1: Venn diagram of the Siamese twin func-
tions fX and hY . The left oval together with the
black point inside it is a Venn diagram represent-
ing the singleton {fX}; the right oval together with
the black point inside it is a Venn diagram repre-
senting the singleton {hy}. The upper arrow rep-
resents the mapping of fX to hY by hY , the lower
arrow the mapping of hY to fX by fX .
2.4 The nonstandard function-theoretical axiom and inference rules
Definition 2.44. The vocabulary of LT as given by Def. 2.1 is extended
(i) with symbols ‘ı’, the iota-operator, and ‘
∧
’, the conjunctor ;
(ii) for any constant Xˆ denoting a set, with enough composite symbols fˆα+ , hˆβ+ , ... such that
each of these is a variable that ranges over a family of ur-functions indexed in Xˆ.
The syntax of LT as given by Def. 2.3 is extended with the following clauses:
(iii) if fˆα+ is a variable as in clause (ii) of Def. 2.44, then fˆα+ is a term;
(iv) if t is a term and ut+ is a composite term with an occurrence of t, and β is a variable
ranging over all things, then ıβ(ut+ : t 7→ β) is a iota-term denoting the image of t under
the ur-function ut+ ;
(v) if Xˆ is a constant designating a set, α a simple variable ranging over all things, and Ψ(α)
an atomic formula of the type t : t′ 7→ t′′ that is open in α, then ∧α∈Xˆ Ψ(α) is a formula;
(vi) if Φ is a formula with a subformula
∧
α∈Xˆ Ψ(α) as in (iii) with an occurrence of a composite
variable fα+ , then (∀fα+)α∈XˆΦ and (∃fα+)α∈XˆΦ are formulas;
(vii) if X is a simple variable ranging over sets, and Υ a formula with no occurrence of X but
with a subformula (∀fα+)α∈XˆΦ as in (iv), then ∀X[X\Xˆ]Υ and ∃X[X\Xˆ]Υ are formulas
with a subformula (∀fα+)α∈X [X\Xˆ]Φ;
(viii) if X is a simple variable ranging over sets, and Υ a formula with no occurrence of X but
with a subformula (∃fα+)α∈XˆΦ as in (iv), then ∀X[X\Xˆ]Υ and ∃X[X\Xˆ]Υ are formulas
with a subformula (∃fα+)α∈X [X\Xˆ]Φ.

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Remark 2.45. Concerning the iota-operator in clause (iv) of Def. 2.44, we thus have
∀α∀fα+∀γ(γ = ıβ(fα+ : α 7→ β)⇔ fα+ : α 7→ γ) (37)
Note that upon assigning constant values to α and fα+ , the term ıβ(fα+ : α 7→ β) always refers
to an existing, unique thing: there is thus no danger of nonsensical terms involved in this use
of the iota-operator. 
Definition 2.46. The following special language elements are added:
(i) if Xˆ is a constant designating a set, X and α simple variables ranging over sets c.q. things,
and fα+ a composite variable ranging over ur-functions on α
+, then
• (∀fα+)α∈Xˆ is a multiple universal quantifier;
• (∃fα+)α∈Xˆ is a multiple existential quantifier;
• (∀fα+)α∈X in the scope of a quantifier ∀X is a universally generalized multiple
universal quantifier;
• (∀fα+)α∈X in the scope of a quantifier ∃X is an existentially generalized multiple
universal quantifier;
• (∃fα+)α∈X in the scope of a quantifier ∀X is a universally generalized multiple
existential quantifier;
• (∃fα+)α∈X in the scope of a quantifier ∃X is an existentially generalized multiple
existential quantifier;
(ii) if Xˆ is a constant designating a set, X a simple variable ranging over sets, and α a simple
variable ranging over all things, then
• ∧α∈Xˆ is a conjunctive operator with constant range;
• ∧α∈X a conjunctive operator with variable range.

Concerning the language elements in clause (i), if
K
and
K′ are existential or universal quan-
tification symbols, then we can generally say that (
K
fα+)α∈Xˆ is a multiple quantifier, and
that (
K
fα+)α∈X in the scope of a quantifier
K′X is a generalized multiple quantifier.
Definition 2.47. If Xˆ is a constant designating a set and
∧
α∈Xˆ Ψ is a subformula of a formula
Φ, then Ψ is the scope of the conjunctive operator; furthermore,
(i) if there is an occurrence of a variable α and/or fˆα+ in the scope of the conjunctive operator,
then a formula
∧
α∈Xˆ Ψ has a semantic occurrence of each of the constants αˆ over which
the variable α ranges, and/or of each of the constant ur-functions uˆαˆ+ over which the
variable fˆα+ ranges—a subformula
∧
α∈Xˆ Ψ has thus to be viewed as the conjunction of
all the formulas [αˆ\α][uˆαˆ+\fˆα+ ]Ψ with αˆ ∈ Xˆ.
(ii) if there is an occurrence of a composite variable fα+ in the scope of the conjunctive
operator, then the subformula
∧
α∈Xˆ Ψ(fα+) has a free semantic occurrence of each of
the simple variables fαˆ+ ranging over ur-functions on the singleton of αˆ with αˆ ∈ Xˆ—
the formula
∧
α∈Xˆ Ψ(fα+) has thus to be viewed as the conjunction of all the formulas
[αˆ\α][fαˆ+\fα+ ]Ψ.

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Definition 2.48. If Xˆ is a constant designating a set,
K
an existential or universal quantifi-
cation symbol, and (
K
fα+)α∈XˆΨ a subformula of a formula Φ, then Ψ is the scope of the
multiple quantifier; likewise for the scope of the generalized multiple quantifiers of Def. 2.46.
If a formula Ψ has a free semantic occurrence of each of the simple variables fαˆ+ with a con-
stant αˆ ∈ Xˆ, then a formula ( Kfα+)α∈XˆΨ has a bounded semantic occurrence of each
of the simple variables fαˆ+ with a constant αˆ ∈ Xˆ. A nonstandard formula Ψ without free
occurrences of variables is a sentence. If X is a simple variable ranging over sets and Ψ is a
sentence with an occurrence of a multiple quantifier (
K
fα+)α∈Xˆ and with no occurrence of X,
then ∀X[X\Xˆ]Ψ and ∃X[X\Xˆ]Ψ are sentences with an occurrence of a generalized multiple
quantifier (
K
fα+)α∈X . 
Axiom 2.49. Sum Function Axiom (SUM-F): for any nonempty set X and for any family of
ur-functions fα+ indexed in X, there is a sum function FX with some codomain Y such that
the conjunction of all mappings by FX of α to its image under the ur-function fα+ holds for α
ranging over X:
∀X 6= ∅(∀fα+)α∈X∃FX∃Y
(
FX : X  Y ∧
∧
α∈X
FX : α 7→ ıβ(fα+ : α 7→ β)
)
(38)

With SUM-F, all non-logical axioms of the present nonstandard theory have been introduced.
But still, rules of inference must be given to derive meaningful theorems from SUM-F. So, the
rules of inference that follow have to be seen as part of the logic.
Inference Rule 2.50. Nonstandard Universal Elimination:
∀XΨ
(
(
K
fα+)α∈X ,
∧
α∈X
)
` [Xˆ\X]Ψ for any constant Xˆ (39)
where Ψ
(
(
K
fα+)α∈X ,
∧
α∈X
)
is a formula with an occurrence of a generalized multiple quantifier
and of a conjunctive operator with variable range, and where [Xˆ\X]Ψ is a formula with an
occurrence of a multiple quantifier (
K
fα+)α∈Xˆ and of a conjunctive operator
∧
α∈Xˆ with constant
range. 
Thus speaking, from SUM-F we can deduce a formula
(∀fα+)α∈Xˆ∃FXˆ∃Y
(
FXˆ : Xˆ  Y ∧
∧
α∈Xˆ
FXˆ : α 7→ ıβ(fα+ : α 7→ β)
)
(40)
for any constant Xˆ designating a set.
Inference Rule 2.51. Multiple Universal Elimination:
(∀fα+)α∈XˆΦ(fα+) ` [fˆα+\fα+ ]Φ (41)
where Φ(fα+) is a formula with an occurrence of the same composite variable fα+ that also
occurs in the preceding multiple universal quantifier (∀fα+)α∈Xˆ, and where fˆα+ is a variable as
meant in clause (ii) of Def. 2.44. 
Thus speaking, from a sentence (40), which is an instance of SUM-F derived by inference rule
2.50, we can derive a formula
∃FXˆ∃Y
(
FXˆ : Xˆ  Y ∧
∧
α∈Xˆ
FXˆ : α 7→ ıβ(fˆα+ : α 7→ β)
)
(42)
for each variable fˆα+ ranging over a family of ur-functions indexed in Xˆ. Note that the range of
such a variable fˆα+ is constructed by assigning to each of the simple variables fαˆ+ semantically
occurring in formula (40) a constant value uˆαˆ+ .
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Inference Rule 2.52. Nonstandard Rule-C:
∃tΦ ` [tˆ\t]Φ (43)
where t is a simple variable x ranging over sets or a simple variable fXˆ ranging over functions
on a constant set, and where tˆ is a constant in the range of t that does not occur in Φ but
for which [tˆ\t]Φ holds. If Φ has an occurrence of a generalized multiple quantifier ( Kfα+)α∈t,
then [tˆ\t]Φ has an occurrence of a multiple quantifier ( Kfα+)α∈tˆ; if Φ has an occurrence of a
conjunctive operator
∧
α∈t with variable range, then [tˆ\t]Φ has an occurrence of a conjunctive
operator
∧
α∈tˆ with constant range. 
Thus speaking, from SUM-F we can deduce a formula
∃Y (FˆXˆ : Xˆ  Y ) ∧
∧
α∈Xˆ
FˆXˆ : α 7→ ıβ(fˆα+ : α 7→ β) (44)
which is a conjunction of a standard first-order formula and a nonstandard formula with an
occurrence of the new constant FˆXˆ, designating the sum function on Xˆ, in the scope of a
conjunctive operator. Of course, this conjunction Ψ∧Φ is true if and only if both its members
are true. This requires one more inference rule.
Inference Rule 2.53. Conjunctive Operator Elimination:∧
α∈Xˆ
Ψ(α) ` [αˆ\α]Ψ(α) (45)
where Ψ(α) is a formula of the type t : t′ 7→ t′′ that is open in α, and αˆ any constant designating
an element of Xˆ. 
Thus speaking, from the right member of the conjunction (44) we can derive an entire scheme,
consisting of one standard first-order formula
FˆXˆ : αˆ 7→ ıβ(uˆαˆ+ : αˆ 7→ β) (46)
for each constant uˆαˆ+ . So given an infinitary conjunction
∧
α∈Xˆ FˆXˆ : α 7→ ıβ(fˆα+ : α 7→ β),
the sentences (46) derived by rule 2.53 are true for each constant uˆαˆ+ semantically occurring
in Eq. (44).
Remark 2.54. Given an individual set X and a variable fα+ that ranges over a family of
ur-functions indexed in X in the universe of the intended model, the unique sum function FX
for which∧
α∈X
FX : α 7→ ıβ(fα+ : α 7→ β) (47)
can, using set-builder notation, be identified with the individual
FX = {〈α, β〉 | α ∈ X ∧ β = fα+(α)}X (48)
in the universe of the intended model. The graph of FX, i.e. the set {〈α, β〉 | α ∈ X∧β = fα(α)}
is certain to exist, see Th. 3.1 (next section). So constructing a sum function is a means to
constructing a set. 
Example 2.55. Consider the infinite ordinal ω from Ax. 2.20: its elements are the finite
ordinals 0, 1, 2, ... Applying Nonstandard Universal Elimination, we thus deduce from SUM-F
that
(∀fα+)α∈ω∃Fω∃Y
(
Fω : ω  Y ∧
∧
α∈ω
FB : α 7→ ıβ(f{α} : α 7→ β)
)
(49)
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On account of the ur-function axiom 2.40 we have
∀x ∈ ω∃fx+(fx+ : x 7→ x) (50)
That is, for any finite ordinal x there is an ur-function that on the singleton of x that maps x to
itself. Let the variable fˆ1α+ range over these identity ur-functions; applying Multiple Universal
Elimination to the sentence (49) then yields a sentence
∃Fω∃Y
(
Fω : ω  Y ∧
∧
α∈ω
Fω : α 7→ ıβ(fˆ1α+ : α 7→ β)
)
(51)
Introducing the new constant 1ω by applying Rule-C to the sentence (51) and substituting
ıβ(fˆ1α+ : α 7→ β) = α then yields the conjunction
1ω : ω  ω ∧
∧
α∈ω
1ω : α 7→ α) (52)
By applying Conjunctive Operator Elimination to the right member of this conjunction (52),
we obtain the countable scheme
1ω : 0 7→ 0
1ω : 1 7→ 1
1ω : 2 7→ 2
...
(53)
This example demonstrates, strictly within the language of T, how SUM-F and the inference
rules can be used to construct the identity function on ω from a family of ur-functions indexed
in ω. 
Remark 2.56. Summarizing, it has thus to be taken
(i) that SUM-F is a typographically finite sentence;
(ii) that an instance (40) of SUM-F, deduced by applying Nonstandard Universal Elimination,
is a typographically finite sentence;
(iii) that a formula (42), deduced from an instance of SUM-F by applying Multiple Universal
Elimination, is a typographically finite sentence;
(iv) that a conjunction (44), deduced by applying Rule-C to a sentence deduced from SUM-
F by successively applying Nonstandard Universal Elimination and Multiple Universal
Elimination, is a typographically finite sentence.
We thus get that SUM-F being true means that every instance (40) of SUM-F obtained by
Nonstandard Universal Elimination is true; that an instance (40) of SUM-F being true means
that for any variable fˆα+ ranging over a family of ur-functions indexed in Xˆ, formula (42) is true;
and that a nonstandard formula (42) with an occurrence of a variable fˆα+ being true means
that, after applying Rule-C, the scheme of standard formulas (46) obtained by Conjunctive
Operator Elimination is true—one true standard formula obtains for every ur-function uˆαˆ+ in
the range of the variable fˆα+ . 
This concludes the axiomatic introduction of the nonstandard theory T. Since we are primarily
interested in the theorems that can be derived from the axioms of T, no rules have been given
for the introduction of (multiple) quantifiers or conjunctive operators. Below such rules are
given for the sake of completeness, but these will not be discussed.
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Inference Rule 2.57. Conjunctive Operator Introduction:
{[I(α)\α]Ψ(α)}I(α)∈Xˆ `
∧
α∈Xˆ
Ψ(α) (54)
where Ψ(α) is a formula of the type t : t′ 7→ t′′ that is open in α, and {[I(α)\α]Ψ(α)}I(α)∈Xˆ is
a possibly infinite collection of formulas, each of which is obtained by interpreting the variable
α as a constant I(α) ∈ Xˆ and replacing α in Ψ(α) everywhere by I(α). 
Note that the collection of formulas {[I(α)\α]Ψ(α)}I(α)∈Xˆ in Eq. (54) is itself not a well-
formed formula of the language LT, but each of the formulas in the collection is.
Inference Rule 2.58. Multiple Universal Introduction:
Φ
(∧
α∈Xˆ
Ψ(fˆα+)
)
` (∀fα+)α∈Xˆ[fα+\fˆα+ ]Φ (55)
where Φ
(∧
α∈XˆΨ(fˆα+)
)
denotes a formula Φ with a subformula
∧
α∈XˆΨ(fˆα+) (implying that
Ψ is an atomic formula of the type t : t′ 7→ t′′), and where the variable fˆα+ ranges over an
arbitrary family of ur-functions indexed in Xˆ. 
Inference Rule 2.59. Multiple Existential Introduction:
Φ
(∧
α∈Xˆ
Ψ(fˆα+)
)
` (∃fα+)α∈Xˆ[fα+\fˆα+ ]Φ (56)
where Φ
(∧
α∈XˆΨ(fˆα+)
)
denotes a formula Φ with a subformula
∧
α∈XˆΨ(fˆα+) (implying that Ψ
is an atomic formula of the type t : t′ 7→ t′′), and where the variable fˆα+ ranges over a specific
family of ur-functions indexed in Xˆ. 
Remark 2.60. Nonstandard Universal Quantification, i.e. the rule
Ψ(Xˆ) ` ∀X[X\Xˆ]Ψ (57)
for a nonstandard formula Ψ with an occurrence of an arbitrary constant Xˆ, and Nonstandard
Existential Quantification, i.e. the rule
Ψ(Xˆ) ` ∃X[X\Xˆ]Ψ (58)
for a nonstandard formula Ψ with an occurrence of a specific constant Xˆ, are the same as in
the standard case, but with the understanding that upon quantification a multiple quantifier
(
K
fα+)α∈Xˆ in Ψ becomes a generalized multiple quantifier (
K
fα+)α∈X in [X\Xˆ]Ψ, and a con-
junctive operator
∧
α∈Xˆ with constant range in Ψ becomes a conjunctive operator
∧
α∈X with
variable range in [X\Xˆ]Ψ. 
3 Discussion
3.1 Main theorems
Theorem 3.1. Graph Theorem: for any set X and any function fX with any codomain Y ,
there is a set Z that is precisely the graph of the function fX—that is, there is a set Z whose
elements are precisely the two-tuples 〈α, β〉 made up of arguments and images of the function
fX . In a formula:
∀X∀fX∀Y (fX : X  Y ⇒ ∃Z∀ζ(ζ ∈ Z ⇔ ∃α∃β(ζ = 〈α, β〉 ∧ fX : α 7→ β)))) (59)

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Proof. Let Xˆ be an arbitrary set, and let the function fˆXˆ be an arbitrary function on Xˆ.
On account of GEN-F (Ax. 2.27), for any α ∈ X there is then precisely one β such that
fˆXˆ : α 7→ β . Using Def. 2.23, there exists then for each α ∈ Xˆ a singleton 〈α, β〉+ such
that fˆXˆ : α 7→ β. On account of the ur-function axiom (Ax. 2.40), there exists then also an
ur-function uα+ : α
+  〈α, β〉+ , uα+ : α 7→ 〈α, β〉 for each α ∈ Xˆ. Thus, on account of SUM-F
there is a sum function GˆXˆ with some codomain Z such that GˆXˆ maps every α ∈ X precisely
to the two-tuple 〈α, β〉 for which fˆXˆ : α 7→ β. On account of GEN-F, the codomain Z of GˆXˆ
exists, and on account of Ax. 2.31 it is unique: this codomain is precisely the graph of fˆXˆ.
Since Xˆ and fˆXˆ were arbitrary, the Graph Theorem follows from universal generalization.
In the intended model of T, there is thus no risk involved in identifying a function f with the
individual graph(f)dom(f), where graph(f) is the graph of f and dom(f) the domain of f , cf.
Rem. 2.54.
Theorem 3.2. Main Theorem: for any nonempty set X, if there is a functional relation Φ(α, β)
that relates every α in X to precisely one β, then there is a function FX with some codomain
Y that maps every η ∈ X to precisely that ξ ∈ Y for which Φ(η, ξ). In a formula, using the
iota-operator:
∀X 6= ∅(∀α ∈ X∃!βΦ(α, β)⇒ ∃FX∃Y (FX : X  Y ∧ ∀η ∈ X(FX : η 7→ ıξΦ(η, ξ)))) (60)

Proof. Let Xˆ be an arbitrary nonempty set. Suppose then, that for every α ∈ X we have
precisely one β such that Φ(α, β). On account of the ur-function axiom (Ax. 2.40), for an
arbitrary constant αˆ ∈ Xˆ there exists then also an ur-function uˆαˆ+ for which
uˆαˆ+ : αˆ 7→ ıβΦ(αˆ, β) (61)
Let the variable fˆα+ range over these ur-functions. We then deduce from SUM-F by applying
Nonstandard Universal Elimination and subsequently Multiple Universal Elimination that
∃FXˆ∃Y
(
FXˆ : Xˆ  Y ∧
∧
α∈Xˆ
FXˆ : α 7→ ıβ(fˆα+ : α 7→ β)
)
(62)
By subsequently applying Rule-C and Conjunctive Operator Elimination we then deduce the
scheme
FˆXˆ : αˆ 7→ ıβΦ(αˆ, β) (63)
for the sum function FˆXˆ. Generalizing this scheme we obtain
∀η ∈ Xˆ(FˆXˆ : η 7→ ıξΦ(η, ξ))) (64)
We thus obtain
∃FXˆ∃Y
(
FXˆ : Xˆ  Y ∧ ∀η ∈ Xˆ(FXˆ : η 7→ ıξΦ(η, ξ)))
)
(65)
Since the functional relation was assumed, we get ∀α ∈ Xˆ∃!βΦ(α, β)⇒ Ψ where Ψ is formula
(65). Since Xˆ was an arbitrary nonempty set, we can quantify over nonempty sets. This gives
precisely the requested formula (60).
Remark 3.3. Theorem 3.2 is an infinite scheme, with one formula for every functional relation
Φ. The point is this: given a set X, on account of this theorem we can construct a function fX
by giving a function prescription—what we then actually do is defining an ur-function for every
α ∈ X; the function fX then exists on account of SUM-F. And by constructing the function
we construct its graph, which exists on account of Th. 3.1. Generally speaking, if we define an
ur-function for each singleton α+ ⊂ X, then we do not yet have the graphs of these ur-functions
in a set. But in the present framework, the set of these graphs is guaranteed to exist. Ergo,
giving a function prescription is constructing a set! 
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3.2 Derivation of SEP and SUB of ZF
We start by proving that the infinite axiom scheme SEP of ZF is a theorem (scheme) of our
theory T:
Theorem 3.4. Separation Axiom Scheme of ZF:
∀X∃Y ∀α(α ∈ Y ⇔ α ∈ X ∧ Φ(α))
Proof. Let Xˆ be an arbitrary set and let Φ be an arbitrary unary relation on Xˆ. On account
of the ur-function axiom (Ax. 2.40), for an arbitrary constant αˆ ∈ Xˆ there exists then an
ur-function uˆαˆ+ for which{
uˆαˆ+ : αˆ 7→ 1 if Φ(αˆ)
uˆαˆ+ : αˆ 7→ 0 if ¬Φ(αˆ) (66)
Let the variable fˆη+ range over these ur-functions. On account of Th. 3.2 we then get
∃FXˆ∀η ∈ Xˆ(FXˆ : η 7→ ıβ(fˆη+ : η 7→ β)) (67)
Let this sum function be designated by the constant FˆXˆ. On account of INV (Ax. 2.35), the
inverse image set Fˆ−1
Xˆ
(1) exists: we then have ∀α(α ∈ Fˆ−1
Xˆ
(1)⇔ α ∈ Xˆ ∧ Φ(α)). Th. 3.4 then
obtains from here by existential generalization and universal generalization.
Proceeding, we prove that the infinite axiom scheme SUB of ZF is a theorem (scheme) of our
theory T:
Theorem 3.5. Substitution Axiom Scheme of ZF:
∀X(∀α ∈ X∃!βΦ(α, β)⇒ ∃Z∀γ(γ ∈ Z ⇔ ∃ξ(ξ ∈ X ∧ Φ(ξ, γ))))
Proof. Let Xˆ be an arbitrary set and let there for every α ∈ Xˆ be precisely one β such that
Φ(α, β). Then on account of Th. 3.2, a sum function FˆXˆ exists for which
∀α ∈ X(FˆXˆ : αˆ 7→ ıβΦ(αˆ, β)) (68)
On account of Ax. 2.31, the codomain of FˆXˆ is the image set; denoting this by FˆXˆ[Xˆ] we then
have
∀γ(γ ∈ FˆXˆ[Xˆ]⇔ ∃ξ(ξ ∈ X ∧ Φ(ξ, γ))) (69)
Since the functional relation Φ on the arbitrary set Xˆ was assumed, this is implied by ∀α ∈
Xˆ∃!βΦ(α, β). We write out this implication: Th. 3.5 then obtains by existential generalization
and universal generalization.
These two theorems schemes provide an argument for considering our theory T to be not weaker
than ZF. However, because in the framework of ZF elements of sets are always sets while in
the present framework elements of sets may also be functions (which are not sets), we have
strictly speaking not yet proven that every result in ZF about sets automatically translates to
the present framework.
Remark 3.6. Should further research on T reveal unintended consequences that render it
inconsistent or otherwise useless, there is still the possibility to remove SUM-F from T add
the above theorem schemes 3.4 and 3.5 as axioms to T. That still gives a theory—although a
standard one with infinitely many axioms—that merges set theory and category theory into a
single framework. 
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3.3 Model theory
Definition 3.7. A model M of the present theory T consists of the universe |M| of M,
which is a concrete category made up of a nonempty collection of objects (sets) and a nonempty
collection of arrows (functions on sets), and the language LM of M, which is the language
LT of T extended with a constant for every object and for every arrow in |M|, such that the
axioms of T are valid in M. 
In standard first-order logic it is well defined what it means that a formula is ‘valid’ in a model
M . This notion of validity translates to the framework of T for all standard formulas. However,
it remains to be established what it means that SUM-F and nonstandard consequences thereof
are valid in a model M of T. Recall that symbols referring to individuals in |M| will be
underlined to distinguish these individuals from constants of T.
Definition 3.8. (Validity of nonstandard formulas.)
(i) a sentence ∀X 6= ∅Ψ with a nonstandard subformula Ψ, such as the sum function axiom,
is valid in a modelM of T if and only if for every assignment g that assigns an individual
nonempty set g(X) = X in |M| as a value to the variable X, [X\X]Ψ is valid in M;
(ii) a sentence (∀fα+)α∈XΦ with an occurrence of an individual nonempty set X of |M|, such
as an instance of SUM-F, is valid in a model M of T if and only if for every ‘team
assignment’ g that assigns an individual ur-function g(fα+) = uα+ in |M| as a value to
each variable fα+ semantically occurring in Φ, the sentence [f
g
α+\fα+ ]Φ with the variable
f gα+ ranging over the family of ur-functions (uα+)α∈X is valid in M;
(iii) a sentence ∃tΥ with an occurrence of a simple variable t ranging over sets or over functions
on a set X and with Υ being a nonstandard formula, such as the sentences that can
be obtained by successively applying Nonstandard Universal Elimination and Multiple
Universal Elimination to SUM-F, is valid in a model M of T if and only if for at least
one assignment g that assigns an individual function g(t) = FX or an individual nonempty
set g(t) = Y as value to the variable t, the sentence [g(t)\t]Υ is valid in M;
(iv) A sentence
∧
α∈XΨ(fα+ , α) is valid in a modelM of T if and only if for every assignment
g that assigns an individual ur-function g(fα+) = uα+ from the range (uα+)α∈X of the
variable fα+ and an individual α as values to the variables fα+ and α respectively, the
sentence [α\α][uα+\fα+ ]Ψ is valid in M.
This defines the validity of the nonstandard formulas that can be deduced from SUM-F in
terms of the well-established validity of standard first-order formulas. 
Proposition 3.9. If T has a model M, then M is not countable.
Proof. Suppose T has a model M, and M is countable. That means that there are only
countably many subsets of N = {0, 1, 2, . . .} inM, and that the powerset P(N) inM contains
those subsets: we thus assume that there are subsets of N that are “missing” in M. Let A be
any subset of N that is not in M, and let h ∈ A. All numbers 0, 1, 2, . . . are in M (including
h), so for an arbitrary number n ∈ N there is thus on account of the ur-function axiom (Ax.
2.40) an ur-function on {n} that maps n to n and an ur-function on {n} that maps n to h.
Since N is in M, we get on account of SUM-F and Nonstandard Universal Elimination that
|=M (∀fp+)p∈N∃FN∃Y
(
FN : N Y ∧
∧
p∈N
FN : p 7→ ıq(fp+ : p 7→ q)
)
(70)
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Eq. (70) being valid inM means thus that for any team assignment g, there is a sum function
FgN in |M| for which
∀p ∈ N(FgN : p 7→ ıq(f gp+ : p 7→ q)) (71)
where the variable f gp+ ranges over ur-functions g(f0+), g(f1+), g(f2+), . . . That said, the crux is
that there is a team assignment g∗ which assigns to the variables f0+ , f1+ , f2+ , . . . , the constants
g∗(f0+), g∗(f1+), g∗(f2+), . . . such that for all n ∈ ω we have{
g∗(fn+) : n 7→ n if n ∈ A
g∗(fn+) : n 7→ h if n 6∈ A (72)
To see that, note that there is (i) at least one team assignment g such that g(f0+) = {〈0, 0〉}{0}
so that g(f0+) : 0 7→ 0, and (ii) at least one team assignment g′ such that g′(f0+) = {〈0,h〉}{0}
so that g′(f0+) : 0 7→ h: it is therefore a certainty that there is at least one team assignment
g0 such that Eq. (72) is satisfied for n = 0. Now assume that there is a team assignment
gk such that Eq. (72) is satisfied for n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}. There is, then, at least one team
assignment gkk+1 such that for n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k} we have gkk+1(fn+) = gk(fn+) and such that
gkk+1(f(k+1)+) = {〈k + 1, k + 1〉}{k+1} so that gkk+1(f(k+1)+) : k + 1 7→ k + 1, and there is then
at least one team assignment gkh such that for n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k} we have gkh(fn+) = gk(fn+)
and such that gkh(f(k+1)+) = {〈k + 1,h〉}{k+1} so that gkh(f(k+1)+) : k + 1 7→ h: it is then a
certainty that there is at least one team assignment gk+1 such that Eq. (72) is satisfied for
n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k + 1}. By induction, there is thus a team assignment g∗ such that Eq. (72) is
satisfied for all n ∈ ω. Ergo, there is a sum function F∗ω for which
∀p ∈ ω(F∗ω : p 7→ g∗(fp+)(p)) (73)
But then we get F∗ω[ω] = A, so A is in M, contrary to what was assumed. Ergo, if T has a
model, it is not countable.
Remark 3.10. Prop. 3.9 is a significant result that does not hold in ZF: given Ths. 3.4 and
3.5, this provides an argument for considering the present theory T to be stronger than ZF.
The crux here is that the nonstandard sentence (70), which is an instance of SUM-F, has to
be valid in M: the notion of validity of Def. 3.8 entails that there are uncountably many
variables f gp+ , ranging over a family of individual ur-functions indexed in N, in the language
of the model. As a result, the subsets of N that can be constructed within the model are
non-denumerable—a model of T in which Multiple Universal Elimination, inference rule 2.51,
applies for at most countably many variables f gp+ is thus nonexisting. Thus speaking, the
Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem does not apply because T is a nonstandard first-order theory,
meaning that it is not the case that T can be reformulated as a standard first-order theory, nor
that T is a second order theory—this latter fact will be proven in the next proposition. 
Proposition 3.11. T is not a second-order theory.
Proof. Let’s assume that T is a second-order theory. That is, let’s assume that the use of a
multiple quantifier (∀f{α})α∈Xˆ amounts to second-order quantification. With such a multiple
quantifier, we de facto quantify over all functional relations on the set Xˆ—note, however,
that we do not quantify over all functional relations on the universe of sets! But this has an
equivalent in ZF: if Xˆ is a constant (a set), and YˆXˆ is the set of all functions from Xˆ to a set
Yˆ, then with the quantifier ∀B∀f ∈ BXˆ in a sentence
∀B∀f ∈ BXˆΨ (74)
we de facto quantify over all functional relations on the set Xˆ too. Ergo, if T is a second-
order theory, then ZF is a second-order theory too. But ZF is a first-order theory, and not a
second-order theory. So by modus tollens, T is not a second-order theory.
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As an additional heuristic argument, we can also directly compare second-order quantification
and the present nonstandard first-order quantification with a multiple quantifier (∀f{α})α∈Xˆ.
Let’s first look at second-order quantification with a quantifier ∀Φ where the variable Φ ranges
over functional relations. An arbitrary individual functional relation Φˆ has the entire proper
class of things as its ‘domain’, so Φˆ corresponds to a proper class of ur-functions: for an arbi-
trary thing αˆ there is a Φˆ-related ur-function uˆαˆ+ for which uˆαˆ+ : αˆ 7→ ıβΦˆ(αˆ, β). A quantifier
∀Φ is thus equivalent to a proper class of simple quantifiers fαˆ+ ranging over ur-functions on
the singleton of a thing αˆ. The universe of T, however, does not contain a set Uˆ of all things,
so there is no multiple quantifier (∀fα+)α∈Uˆ which would be equivalent to quantifier ∀Φ: a
multiple quantifier (∀fα+)α∈Xˆ is at most equivalent to an infinite set of simple quantifiers fαˆ+
and the degree of infinity is then bounded by the notion of a set. Thus speaking, since a set does
not amount to a proper class, a multiple quantifier (∀fα+)α∈Xˆ does not amount to second-order
quantification. See the figure below for an illustration.
(a) 2nd order (b) nonstandard 1st order
Figure 2: Illustration of the heuristic argument. In both diagrams (a) and (b), all things
in the universe of T are for illustrative purposes represented on the horizontal and vertical
axes. In diagram (a), the dotted black line represents an arbitrary functional relation Φˆ: each
dot corresponds to a constant ur-function as indicated, so the dotted line is equivalent to a
proper class of ur-functions. In diagram (b) it is indicated of which things on the horizontal
axis the set Xˆ is made up, and each of the black dots within the red oval corresponds to a
constant ur-functions: the dotted line segment is thus equivalent to a set of ur-functions. So, a
multiple quantifier (∀fα+)α∈Xˆ cannot be equivalent to a quantifier ∀Φ.
3.4 The axioms of category theory
In Def. 1.1 it has been assumed that the universe of sets and functions is a category. In this
section we prove that the axioms of category theory for the arrows indeed hold for the functions
(which are the arrows of the present category). That means that we must prove the following:
(i) that domain and codomain of any function on any set are unique;
(ii) that, given sets X and Y and functions fX and gY with Y = fX [X], there is a function
hX = gY ◦ fX such that hX maps every α ∈ X to the image under gY of its image under
fX ;
(iii) that for any set X there is a function 1X such that fX ◦ 1X = fX and 1fX [X] ◦ fX = fX
for any function fX on X.
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Ad(i): domain and codomain of a function fX are unique
This has already been proven in Sect. 2.3. GEN-F (Ax. 2.27) guarantees that for any set X,
any function fX has at least one domain and at least one codomain. Ax. 2.28 guarantees that
no other thing (set or function) than X is a domain of fX . And Ax. 2.31 guarantees that
no other thing (set or function) than the image set fX [X] is a codomain of fX . That proves
uniqueness of domain and codomain.
Ad(ii): existence of the composite of two functions
Given a set X, a function fX and a function gY with Y = fX [X], there is for every α ∈ X
precisely one ur-function hα+ such that
hα+ : α 7→ ıβ(gY : fX(α) 7→ β) (75)
So, there is a sum function HX that maps each α ∈ X precisely to its image under the ur-
function hα+ for which ıξ(hα+ : α 7→ ξ) = ıβ(gY : fX(α) 7→ β). This sum function is precisely
the composite HX = gY ◦ fX . The proof that function composition is associative is omitted.
Ad(iii): existence of an identity function on any set X
Given a set X, there is for every α ∈ X precisely one ur-function 1α+ for which
1α+ : α 7→ α (76)
Therefore, there is a sum function FX that maps every α ∈ X precisely to ıξ(1α+ : α 7→ ξ) = α.
This sum function is the requested function 1X . The proof that this sum function 1X satisfies
the properties that gX ◦ 1X = gX and 1gX [X] ◦ gX = gX for any function gX on X, is omitted.
This shows that the axioms for a category hold for the proper class of functions.
3.5 Concerns regarding inconsistency
We address the main concerns regarding inconsistency, which are in particular that the existence
of a set of all sets or a set of all functions can be derived from T.
Conjecture 3.12. The category of sets and functions does not contain a set of all sets.
Heuristic argument: A set Uˆ of all sets does not exist (i) because REG (Ax. 2.22) excludes
that Uˆ exists a priori, and (ii) because SUM-F, the only constructive axiom of T that is not
a theorem of ZF, excludes that Uˆ exists by construction. The crux is that one must first have
constructed the set X before one can construct a sum function FX : the set X is thus a regular
set, and by applying SUM-F one cannot create a new set with a higher cardinality than the set
X because the graph of FX contains precisely one element for each element of X. The same for
the image set FX [X]: it cannot have a higher cardinality than X. Therefore, SUM-F doesn’t
allow the construction of a set Uˆ of all sets. 
Conjecture 3.13. The category of sets and functions on sets does not contain a set Ωˆ of all
functions.
Heuristic argument: Suppose that we have a set Ωˆ such that
∀X∀fX(fX ∈ Ωˆ) (77)
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Then on account of Th. 3.4 we can single out the subset Ωˆ1 of all identity functions:
∀α(α ∈ Ωˆ1 ⇔ α ∈ Ωˆ ∧ ∃X(α = 1X)) (78)
But then there also exists the identity function 1Ωˆ1 , for which 1Ωˆ1 : Ωˆ1  Ωˆ1, 1Ωˆ1 : 1Ωˆ1 7→ 1Ωˆ1 .
This latter feature that 1Ωˆ1 maps itself to itself contradicts the axiom of regularity for functions,
REG-F (Ax.2.42). Ergo, there is no set Ωˆ of all functions. 
4 Conclusions
The main conclusion is that the aim stated in the introduction has been achieved: a theory
T, with a vocabulary containing countably many constants, has been introduced which lacks
the two unwanted c.q. pathological features of ZF. Each axiom of T is a typographically finite
sentence, so contrary to what’s the case with infinitary logics, each axiom can be written down
explicitly. But not just that: T is finitely axiomatized, so contrary to what’s the case with ZF,
the entire theory T can be written down explicitly on a piece of paper. In addition, it has been
shown that T, contrary to ZF, does not have a countable model—if it has a model at all, that
is. This failure of the downward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem for T is due to the nonstandard
nature of T.
Furthermore, three reasons can be given as to why T might be potentially applicable as a
foundational theory for mathematics. First of all, it has been proven that the axioms of ZF,
translated in the language LT of T, can be derived from T. While we acknowledge that this
result does not automatically imply that all theorems about sets derived within the framework
of ZF are necessarily also true in the framework of T because in the latter framework sets exist
whose elements aren’t sets, it nevertheless shows that the tools available in the framework ZF
for constructing sets are also available in the framework of T. Secondly, it has been proved that
the axioms of a category hold for the universe of discourse that is associated to T, which is a
category of sets and functions: this universe might then serve as the ontological basis for the
various (large) categories studied in category theory. Thirdly, T is easy to use in everyday’s
mathematical practice because for any set X we can construct a function fX by giving a defining
function prescription fX : X  Y , fX : α def7−→ ιβΦ(α, β) where Φ is some functional relation:
T then guarantees that FX exists, as well as its graph, its image set, and the inverse image sets
for every element of its codomain—ergo, giving a defining function prescription is a tool for
constructing sets.
On the other hand, the present theory T gives immediately rise to at least three purely
aesthetical arguments for rejection. First of all, the universe of T contains sets and functions,
the latter being objects sui generis: this entails a departure from the adage ‘everything is a
set’ that holds in the framework of ZF(C), and that will be enough to evoke feelings of dislike
among mathematical monists who hold the position that set theory, in particular ZF or ZFC,
has to be the foundation for mathematics. Secondly, although the universe of T is a category,
the formal language of T contains ∈-relations t1 ∈ t2 as atomic formulas: an ∈-relation is, thus,
not reduced to a mapping in the language of category theory, and that fact alone will be enough
to evoke feelings of dislike among mathematical monists who hold the position that category
theory has to be the foundation for mathematics. Thirdly, the language of T entails a rather
drastic departure from standard first-order language: that will be enough to evoke feelings of
dislike among those who attach a notion of beauty to the standard first-order language of ZF(C),
or who consider that the language of category theory is all of the language of mathematics.
That said, since T is a nonstandard theory there is the obvious risk that T is not (relatively)
consistent. It is true that we have argued that the category of sets and functions cannot contain
a set of all sets nor a set of all functions, but it remains the case that further research may reveal
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that T has unintended consequences which render it inconsistent. Furthermore, a limitation
of this study is that the axiom of choice has been left out. We can easily express AC in the
language LT as
∀X 6= ∅(Θ(X)⇒ ∃fX∀Z ∈ X∀γ(fX : Z 7→ γ ⇒ γ ∈ Z) (79)
where Θ(X) stands for
∀α ∈ X∃Y (α = Y ∧ ∃η(η ∈ Y )) ∧ ∀U ∈ X∀V ∈ X 6 ∃β(β ∈ U ∧ β ∈ V ) (80)
But the question is whether this has to be added as an axiom, or whether it can be derived
as a theorem of T—we certainly have for any Z ∈ X that there is an ur-function fZ+ such
that ıξ(fZ+ : Z 7→ ξ) ∈ Z. We leave this as a topic for further research. Another limitation
of the present study is that it has not been investigated whether the calculus has any of the
various soundness and completeness properties. It may then very well turn out that minor
details in the definitions for the nonstandard syntax and semantics require some revisions, but
this is left as a topic for further research—(dis-)proving that these properties hold is a sizeable
research project in itself. Of course, contrary to the aesthetic arguments mentioned above,
which can be dismissed as nonmathematical, negative results in that direction may yield a
serious, mathematical argument to reject the present nonstandard theory as a foundation for
mathematics.
We therefore cannot but conclude this paper with the cliche that further research is neces-
sary: additional results are needed to establish whether the nonstandard theory T introduced
in this paper constitutes an advancement in the foundations of mathematics. The proven fact
that T lacks the pathological features of ZF may provide a reason for such further research, but
it is emphasized that it may turn out to be a dead end. That is to say: the present marriage of
set theory and category theory may look promising from a certain perspective, but it still may
end in divorce.
Acknowledgements The author wants to thank Harrie de Swart (Erasmus University Rot-
terdam), Jean Paul van Bendegem and Colin Rittberg (both Free University of Brussels) for
their useful comments. This research has been facilitated by the Foundation Liberalitas (the
Netherlands)
References
[1] E. Zermelo, Math. Ann. 65, 261–281 (1908)
[2] L. Lo¨wenheim, Math. Ann. 68, 169–207 (1915)
[3] Th. Skolem, Einige Bemerkungen zur axiomatischen Begrundung der Mengenlehre, Proc.
5th Scand. Math. Congr. Helsinki, 217–232 (1922)
[4] E. Mendelson, An Introduction to Mathematical Logic, 4th ed. (Chapman & Hall, London,
1997)
[5] D. Van Dalen, H.D. Ebbinghaus, Bull. Symb. Logic 6(2), 145–161 (2000)
[6] R. Montague, Contributions to the Axiomatic Foundations of Set Theory, dissertation,
University of California, Berkeley (1957)
[7] F.W. Lawvere, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 52, 1506–1511 (1964)
26
[8] F.W. Lawvere, The Category of Categories as a Foundation of Mathematics, in: S. Eilen-
berg, D.K. Harrison, H. Ro¨hrl, S. MacLane (Eds.), Proceedings of the Conference on Cat-
egorical Algebra, held June 7-12, 1965, in La Jolla (Springer Verlag, Berlin), 1–20 (1966)
[9] J. Mayberry, Philos. Math. 3(2), 16–35 (1990)
[10] E. Landry, Philos. Sci. 66, Supplement Issue, S14-S27 (1999)
[11] L.T.F. Gamut, Logic, Language and Meaning, Vol. 1, (Chicago UP, Chicago), p. 71 (1991)
[12] M.J.T.F. Cabbolet, Finitely Axiomatized Set Theory: a nonstandard first-order theory
implying ZF. arXiv:1402.1017 (withdrawn)
[13] P. Bernays, Axiomatic Set Theory (Dover Publications Inc., Mineola, 1968)
[14] J.L. Bell, Infinitary Logic, in: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edi-
tion), E.N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/logic-
infinitary/.
[15] M.J.T.F. Cabbolet, Thought 4(4), 237–242 (2015)
[16] A. Levy, Basic Set Theory (Springer Verlag, Berlin), p. 52 (1979)
[17] L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co,
London), 3.333 (1922)
[18] F.A. Muller, Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 52, 539–573 (2001)
27
